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	<title>Comments on: Zaptastic Author Misses the Point</title>
	<atom:link href="http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15</link>
	<description>Every system has a user.</description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 15 Mar 2010 02:08:15 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Kragen Sitaker</title>
		<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15#comment-69</link>
		<dc:creator>Kragen Sitaker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 29 May 2005 21:11:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/#comment-69</guid>
		<description>Generally the file-open dialog has to know whether it's being used to find a file to write or a file to read (and possibly also write), and it's typically already provided either by the OS itself or by widely-shared libraries.  "make public" is a special case that I never use file-open dialogs for.  And once your program has access to the file, it can delegate that access to another user, at least as long as it continues to run.

Certainly you can imagine an unlimited number of ways to restrict permission --- time of day, byte offsets within the file, read and write bandwidth limits, etc. --- but you don't need to go that far to make some progress.  The perfect is the enemy of the good!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Generally the file-open dialog has to know whether it&#8217;s being used to find a file to write or a file to read (and possibly also write), and it&#8217;s typically already provided either by the OS itself or by widely-shared libraries.  &#8220;make public&#8221; is a special case that I never use file-open dialogs for.  And once your program has access to the file, it can delegate that access to another user, at least as long as it continues to run.</p>
<p>Certainly you can imagine an unlimited number of ways to restrict permission &#8212; time of day, byte offsets within the file, read and write bandwidth limits, etc. &#8212; but you don&#8217;t need to go that far to make some progress.  The perfect is the enemy of the good!</p>
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		<title>By: Ian Bicking</title>
		<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15#comment-66</link>
		<dc:creator>Ian Bicking</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 May 2005 05:50:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/#comment-66</guid>
		<description>The file open dialog seems *more* complicated than the bandwidth one.  What permission are you giving when you select a file?  Read, write, delete, make public, send across network, delegate permissions to another user...?  It doesn't matter now, because the program could have done any of those if it wanted (or if it couldn't, the dialog doesn't change that).  The file dialog grants no permissions now.  But if it mattered, how could the distinctions be represented?  

Would file selection become an operating system responsibility, with a secure way of informing the user what permissions would be granted?  (Like "select a file for reading")  That's possible, but putting security in the user interface is hard too -- phishing has certainly shown us that.

And there's *so many* levels of permission, more than the user can probably understand.  I could spend hours talking about the possibilities with a user, and that's human-to-human communication.  Computers are hardly going to be better at it.  An important problem, to be sure, but there's no magic bullet.  It's not even an AI-complete problem -- it's harder than that, because we can't do it for ourselves.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The file open dialog seems *more* complicated than the bandwidth one.  What permission are you giving when you select a file?  Read, write, delete, make public, send across network, delegate permissions to another user&#8230;?  It doesn&#8217;t matter now, because the program could have done any of those if it wanted (or if it couldn&#8217;t, the dialog doesn&#8217;t change that).  The file dialog grants no permissions now.  But if it mattered, how could the distinctions be represented?  </p>
<p>Would file selection become an operating system responsibility, with a secure way of informing the user what permissions would be granted?  (Like &#8220;select a file for reading&#8221;)  That&#8217;s possible, but putting security in the user interface is hard too &#8212; phishing has certainly shown us that.</p>
<p>And there&#8217;s *so many* levels of permission, more than the user can probably understand.  I could spend hours talking about the possibilities with a user, and that&#8217;s human-to-human communication.  Computers are hardly going to be better at it.  An important problem, to be sure, but there&#8217;s no magic bullet.  It&#8217;s not even an AI-complete problem &#8212; it&#8217;s harder than that, because we can&#8217;t do it for ourselves.</p>
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		<title>By: Ping</title>
		<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15#comment-65</link>
		<dc:creator>Ping</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 May 2005 04:02:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/#comment-65</guid>
		<description>True, expressing and interpreting intentions are hard, but they may not be as hard as you think, or in as exceptional a way as you think.  Expression and interpretation of intent happens all the time in every user interface.

For example, every time you choose a file from a file dialog box, you are specifying a limited transfer of file access authority, and it's a pretty common operation.

I agree that when the software uses wide-ranging network access you're dealing with a more difficult case.  The bandwidth limit is easy — just drag a slider — but if you're talking about something that prefetches, you'd have to give out access to your complete browsing trail.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>True, expressing and interpreting intentions are hard, but they may not be as hard as you think, or in as exceptional a way as you think.  Expression and interpretation of intent happens all the time in every user interface.</p>
<p>For example, every time you choose a file from a file dialog box, you are specifying a limited transfer of file access authority, and it&#8217;s a pretty common operation.</p>
<p>I agree that when the software uses wide-ranging network access you&#8217;re dealing with a more difficult case.  The bandwidth limit is easy — just drag a slider — but if you&#8217;re talking about something that prefetches, you&#8217;d have to give out access to your complete browsing trail.</p>
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		<title>By: Ping</title>
		<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15#comment-64</link>
		<dc:creator>Ping</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 May 2005 03:56:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/#comment-64</guid>
		<description>It ought to make the distinction.  I'll look into it.

&lt;a href="http://www.essay-lab.com/"&gt;[ essay writing service ]&lt;/a&gt;	</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It ought to make the distinction.  I&#8217;ll look into it.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.essay-lab.com/">[ essay writing service ]</a></p>
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		<title>By: Adam Shostack</title>
		<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15#comment-62</link>
		<dc:creator>Adam Shostack</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2005 22:48:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/#comment-62</guid>
		<description>(Speaking of usable, does the software left you offer a distinction between comments and trackbacks?  Because my trackback, above, looks pretty strange presented as a comment.)

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(Speaking of usable, does the software left you offer a distinction between comments and trackbacks?  Because my trackback, above, looks pretty strange presented as a comment.)</p>
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		<title>By: Emergent Chaos</title>
		<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15#comment-61</link>
		<dc:creator>Emergent Chaos</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2005 20:19:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/#comment-61</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Emergent Bits: Iranian Blogger, Economics, Security myths&lt;/strong&gt;

 Iranian blogger Mojtaba Saminejad has declared a hunger strike to protest his imprisonment. The Committee to Protect Bloggers has asked that we observe a media fast next Thursday, May 26th and not blog. There are also email addresses to...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Emergent Bits: Iranian Blogger, Economics, Security myths</strong></p>
<p> Iranian blogger Mojtaba Saminejad has declared a hunger strike to protest his imprisonment. The Committee to Protect Bloggers has asked that we observe a media fast next Thursday, May 26th and not blog. There are also email addresses to&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Richard M. Conlan</title>
		<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15#comment-60</link>
		<dc:creator>Richard M. Conlan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2005 17:58:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/#comment-60</guid>
		<description>Part of this perceptive problem comes down to the fact that when most people evaluate a piece of software and see an insecurity of it, they tend to think of methods to secure it along the lines of adding bars to a window. They think of additions and things that can be implemented within the framework of the existing system to help buttress the security.

This stems in part from past experience. With many products security features are added as an afterthought or included as an optional component. This compounds the problem of thinking of usability and security as complementary because cobbling security ON TOP of a usable system usually means adding prompts and passwords and other hindrances to using the existing them insecurely. Then there are full products that serve this sort of "security band-aid" purpose, such as anti-virus and firewall applications.

Unfortunately most people do not think of security solutions that involve redesigning the system. From a business perspective it seems too costly and too impractical, so we are left with cobbled constructs. And, sadly, in software there seems to be only limited cross-pollination - people do not seem to be inclined to learn from mistakes of the past unless they were MAJOR and FLASHY mistakes.

Of course, redesigning the system, or designing with HCISEC in mind in the first place, would avoid many of these problems. But...there are hurdles here; in particular that there are to my knowledge NO consumer oriented references available on secure HCI design. Why is this? I believe it is highly that the field is still finding its footing and there are too many open questions to nail down firm guidelines. Thankfully, the field seems to be moving in the right direction, and hopefully guidance will be forthcoming.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Part of this perceptive problem comes down to the fact that when most people evaluate a piece of software and see an insecurity of it, they tend to think of methods to secure it along the lines of adding bars to a window. They think of additions and things that can be implemented within the framework of the existing system to help buttress the security.</p>
<p>This stems in part from past experience. With many products security features are added as an afterthought or included as an optional component. This compounds the problem of thinking of usability and security as complementary because cobbling security ON TOP of a usable system usually means adding prompts and passwords and other hindrances to using the existing them insecurely. Then there are full products that serve this sort of &#8220;security band-aid&#8221; purpose, such as anti-virus and firewall applications.</p>
<p>Unfortunately most people do not think of security solutions that involve redesigning the system. From a business perspective it seems too costly and too impractical, so we are left with cobbled constructs. And, sadly, in software there seems to be only limited cross-pollination - people do not seem to be inclined to learn from mistakes of the past unless they were MAJOR and FLASHY mistakes.</p>
<p>Of course, redesigning the system, or designing with HCISEC in mind in the first place, would avoid many of these problems. But&#8230;there are hurdles here; in particular that there are to my knowledge NO consumer oriented references available on secure HCI design. Why is this? I believe it is highly that the field is still finding its footing and there are too many open questions to nail down firm guidelines. Thankfully, the field seems to be moving in the right direction, and hopefully guidance will be forthcoming.</p>
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		<title>By: Ian Bicking</title>
		<link>http://usablesecurity.com/?p=15#comment-59</link>
		<dc:creator>Ian Bicking</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2005 16:25:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://usablesecurity.com/2005/05/19/zaptastic/#comment-59</guid>
		<description>But expressing consent and formalizing the limits of authority are really really hard.  We can't do it between humans; how can humans express that to computers?  Programmers can't manage it, how can users who are less able to formally communicate to a computer?

For instance, consider the lowly "download optimizer".  It's a plausible piece of software.  The user might want it.  It doesn't break their data.  But it does take up their bandwidth.  How much bandwidth is okay?  How much confirmation from the user is necessary?  What are the privacy implications?  Is there any way at all to audit how it is preserving privacy from the outside?  This is the subtle boundary between a helpful program and a trojan, and one that is crossed regularly these days.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>But expressing consent and formalizing the limits of authority are really really hard.  We can&#8217;t do it between humans; how can humans express that to computers?  Programmers can&#8217;t manage it, how can users who are less able to formally communicate to a computer?</p>
<p>For instance, consider the lowly &#8220;download optimizer&#8221;.  It&#8217;s a plausible piece of software.  The user might want it.  It doesn&#8217;t break their data.  But it does take up their bandwidth.  How much bandwidth is okay?  How much confirmation from the user is necessary?  What are the privacy implications?  Is there any way at all to audit how it is preserving privacy from the outside?  This is the subtle boundary between a helpful program and a trojan, and one that is crossed regularly these days.</p>
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